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Abstract. The deferred acceptance mechanism has been widely adopted across central-
ized matching markets, despite the fact that it provides participants with opportunities
to “game the system.” Accounting for the lack of information that participants typically
have in these markets in practice, I introduce a new notion of behavior under uncertainty
that captures participants’ aversion to experience regret. I show that participants opti-
mally choose not to manipulate the deferred acceptance mechanism in order to avoid
regret. Moreover, the deferred acceptance mechanism is the unique mechanism within
an interesting class (quantile-stable) to induce honesty from participants in this way.
Keywords: Market Design; Deferred Acceptance; Regret; Manipulation; Strategy-
proof; Stable mechanisms.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) occupies a central place in the practice of market
design. Among its various applications it is used in two-sided markets to assign rabbis to con-
gregations (one-to-one matching), and to assign graduating medical students to their first position
as residents in the U.S. (many-to-one matching).1 Its success has been largely attributed to the
fact that it is a stable mechanism.2 That is, it takes as input the preferences of participants over
their potential partners in the form of ranked order lists, and outputs a matching such that there
is no applicant and program pair who prefer each other over their assigned partner. Since the DA
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produces a matching that is stable with respect to the reported preferences, truthful elicitation of
preferences is paramount. However, it is known that every stable mechanism is manipulable (Dubins
and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982). That is, there are configurations of reports that would make it
profitable for an agent to misrepresent her preferences when submitting her ranked order list.
This paper reconciles the deferred acceptance mechanism with truth-telling behavior by its
participants by leveraging the presence of incomplete information found inmost real-worldmarkets,
and understanding behavior through the lenses of regret avoidance. To do so, I introduce a new
notion of regret: An agent suffers regret if she takes an action (e.g. submits a ranked ordered list),
and she finds it to be dominated given the information she has ex-post. A mechanism is regret-free
truth-telling if no agent ever regrets reporting their preferences truthfully.3 Crucially, whether an
agent regrets a report depends both on her private information as well as on the feedback that
she receives from the mechanism. In a typical application, participants are uncertain about others’
preferences and reports. Moreover, the feedback received by participants is limited to the outcome
of the mechanism (the matching), while true preferences, and submitted reports remain private,
even ex-post.
In the context of one-to-one matching, both the applicant- and program-proposing deferred
acceptance mechanisms (DA) provide agents on both sides of the market with incentives to report
their preferences truthfully if they wish to avoid regret, when the information structure presents the
features of a typical matching market discussed above. Moreover, truth is the unique report that is
guaranteed to be free of regret in a market that uses the DA. Consequently, the unique prediction
under regret-free behavior, incomplete information, and limited feedback, is that the matching that
results from the DA is stable with respect to the true preferences.
The paper also provides a rationalization of the salience of the DA over other stable mechanisms.
Regret-free truth-telling characterizes the DA among a class of stable mechanisms known as
quantile-stable mechanisms, introduced and studied in Teo and Sethuraman (1998); Klaus and Klijn
(2006); Chen et al. (2014, 2016b), among others. Although DA is not unique in the unrestricted
domain of all possible stable mechanisms, no stable mechanism that differs from DA whenever
possible can be regret-free truth-telling.4,5
3As a notion, regret-free truth-telling is weaker than strategy-proofness, and ex-post incentive compatibility, while
stronger than undominated and worst-case minimizing (truth-telling) behavior; section 6.
4The only other stable and regret-free truth-telling mechanisms that I have found seem to be arbitrary (e.g. which
stable matching is selected depends on how participants rank the partners that they find unacceptable), and in all cases
they assign to every agent the partner that they would get in (either) the applicant- or program-proposing DA.
5Outside the class of stable matchings, a companion paper - in preparation - shows that neither the Boston
3
In the context of many-to-one matching, the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism
continues to provide regret-free truth-telling incentives to agents on both sides of the market.
However, the program-proposing deferred acceptance is not regret-free truth-telling for programs.
The result further supports the decision made by the Board of Directors of the National Residency
Matching Program (NRMP) to switch from the program-proposing to the applicant-proposing
deferred acceptance over concerns of strategic manipulations.6
The intuition behind the results relates the rules of the mechanism to (i) the inferences that
agents can make based on observables; (ii) the shape that profitable misrepresentations take, when
profitable; and (iii) how such misrepresentations fare when it is not profitable to manipulate. The
shape that misrepresentations must take to manipulate the DA when profitable, are such that they
typically lead to detrimental outcomes when it is not profitable to manipulate. For the other stable
mechanisms considered in this paper, this is not the case. Having observed a matching, they may
regret truth-telling, since submitting an honest but shorter list (that includes the observed partner)
would have yielded better outcomes; see section 5.2 for details.
The paper contributes to several strands of literature, reviewed in detail in section 7. Notably, it
complements the insightful literature that rationalizes the success of stable mechanisms by showing
that the gains from manipulations can be small (in an appropriate sense) when markets are large
(Roth and Peranson, 1999; Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak, 2009; Lee, 2017;
Azevedo and Budish, 2019, among others) or unbalanced (Ashlagi et al., 2017). The large and
unbalanced markets approaches address the empirical ubiquity of small cores, and establish that
stable outcomes can be supported in an (not necessarily unique) approximate equilibrium. The
small cores argument is not suitable to distinguish among different stable mechanisms. In the case
of many-to-one matchings, the arguments do not carry over straightforwardly since the size of the
core does not per se limit the ability of programs to manipulate a stable mechanism.7 In contrast,
this paper is silent with regard to the empirical ubiquity of small cores, but supports a stable
matching as the unique outcome of the DA when agents avoid regret. Additionally, it distinguishes
mechanism, nor the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism satisfy regret-free truth-telling for all participants.
6Roth and Peranson (1999) reports on the redesign of the NRMP, the reasons behind it, and an evaluation of the
effect of these changes.
7Kojima and Pathak (2009) directly addresses the many-to-one environment, but relies on the assumption that
participants submit short lists (limited acceptability). This assumption implies that a significant fraction of the market
would remained unmatched, which does not fit the empirical evidence of the medical match. Regarding the unbalanced
markets approach to many-to-one matching, Ashlagi et al. (2017) state: “ We note that these results do not imply that
colleges cannot gain from manipulation in unbalanced matching markets (...) We therefore conjecture that when the
imbalance is larger than a college’s capacity, even colleges have a limited scope for manipulation, but this conjecture
does not directly follow from our analysis, which only establishes that the core is small.”
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DA from other stable mechanisms in terms of the incentives to report truthfully, and its insights
can be applied to the many-to-one context. The paper also contributes to the analysis of stable
matching under incomplete information under different behavioral notions (Barberà and Dutta,
1995; Roth and Rothblum, 1999; Ehlers and Massó, 2007, 2015; Troyan and Morrill, 2020), and
to the understanding of what distinguishes the deferred acceptance from other mechanisms (e.g.
Kojima and Manea, 2010, among others).8
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents an illustrative example of the notions
of manipulability and regret in the DA. Section 3 introduces basic definitions in matching, as well
as quantile- and interior-stable mechanisms. Section 4 introduces the notion of regret. Section 5.1
and 5.2 present the results for one-to-one and many-to-one matching environments respectively,
while section 5.3 discusses the informational limits of the results. Section 6 discusses the relation
between regret-free truth-telling and other notions of incentive compatibility. Section 7 frames the
paper in the context of the literature. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
Before presenting the formal framework, it is useful to illustrate the notions of manipulability
and regret through the following example in the context of the medical residency match.
There are two doctors (Alice and Bob) and two hospitals (City and General), with one vacancy
each. Suppose that the true preferences are given by:9
Alice: General,City General: Bob,Alice
Bob: City,General City: Alice,Bob
All participants submit their preferences to the clearinghouse in the form of ranked order lists
(which may differ from their true preferences). The clearinghouse uses the hospital-proposing DA,
orH-DA, to generate the matching. It does so by simulating a sequence of proposals and rejections
as follows: Hospitals simultaneously make offers to the doctor at the top of their lists. Doctors
tentatively hold the best ranked offer among those received, and reject the rest. Hospitals that were
8Gale and Shapley (1962) characterize DA through constrained efficiency subject to stability; Balinski and Sönmez
(1999) characterize DA as the unique stable mechanism that respects improvements; Alcalde and Barberà (1994) char-
acterize DA by stability and strategy-proofness under the domain restriction of preferences satisfying top-dominance.
Kojima and Manea (2010) characterize DA as the unique stable weakly Maskin monotonic mechanism.
9Following the convention that if Alice prefers General to City, it is listed asAlice: General,City. If an alternative
is unacceptable to the agent, it is simply not listed.
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rejected make new offers to their top ranked doctors that have not rejected them yet. The process
iterates until there are no more rejections, with the last tentative match becoming the final output.
Suppose that Alice knows that all other participants are reporting their preferences truthfully. She
decides to try to game the system, and lists only General, with the implication that she is not willing
to work for City. Given the reported preferences of others and the rules of H-DA, this strategy
is in fact successful. Had Alice report her preferences truthfully, she would have been matched
to City. By misrepresenting her preferences, in this scenario, she is matched to General which is
her top choice. This strategy is known as a truncation. It is a salient strategy in the literature and,
under complete information, it is sufficient to consider misrepresentations of the form of truncation
strategies (see, for example, Roth and Rothblum, 1999; Ehlers, 2008; Coles and Shorrer, 2014).
However, in real-world applications the participants have incomplete information both ex-ante
and ex-post; they do not know the preferences of others nor their reports. Privacy concerns limit
the amount of information that is revealed even after the matching is implemented. Meaning that
while participants observe the resulting matching, the reports remain private even ex-post.
Suppose that Alice is not certain about the preferences and reports of others. Alice performs the
truncation in which she only lists General, and observes that the resulting match is:Alice Bob ·
· General City

Alice can ask herself which reports are consistent with the observed match. By the stability of the
DA, she can conclude that General prefers Bob over her. Otherwise, herself and General would
constitute a blocking pair. However, Alice cannot distinguish whether she is acceptable or not for
General. Nor can she distinguish whether Bob’s preferences coincide with hers or not. That is,
by observing the resulting outcome, she can rule out some sets of reports, but is still not able to
uniquely pin down what are the reports that everyone sent.
Can Alice come up with an alternative report that, given the information she now has, would
have yield her a better outcome than remaining unemployed? The answer is Yes. From the stability
of DA, it follows that had she told the truth, she could not be worse off than remaining unemployed.
Moreover, she knows that there exist scenarios consistent with her observation (e.g. Bob sharing
her preferences) where City wanted to hire her, but where her truncation prevented her from being
hired. In any such scenario, had she told the truth, she would have been matched to City which she
strictly prefers to being unemployed.
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Hence, having observed the matching, Alice knows that she would have done better by being
honest, and therefore we say in this case that Alice regrets having truncated her preferences.
3. FRAMEWORK
This section presents the basic definitions of one-to-one matching markets (section 3.1), as
well as domains of stable mechanisms that are considered throughout the paper: quantile- and
interior-stable (section 3.2).
3.1. Basic definitions
A one-to-one matching (or marriage) market is a triple (M,W,).M is a finite set of men, and
W a finite set of women. Each manm is endowed with a strict preference relation, denoted (m),
over the set of women and the possibility of remaining single/unmatched (W ∪ {m}). Woman w is
acceptable to m whenever w m m, otherwise w is unacceptable to m. Similarly (w) is woman
w’s strict preference onM ∪ {w}. For an agent i ∈ M ∪W , the weak order associated with i is
denoted i, and the set of all possible linear orderings for i is denoted by Pi. The preferences of
all agents constitute a preference profile, = ((m)m∈M , (w)w∈W ).10
A matching µ : M ∪ W → M ∪ W assigns to each man m either a woman or himself,
µ(m) ∈ W ∪ {m}; to each woman w either a man or herself, µ(w) ∈ M ∪ {w}; and does so in
a consistent fashion, µ(m) = w ⇐⇒ µ(w) = m. The set of all matchings for a fixed marriage
market is denotedM, and µ(m) ism’s partner under µ.
A matching µ is individually rational if every agent prefers their assigned partner to remaining
single; that is, µ(i) i i, ∀i ∈ M ∪W . A matching µ is blocked by a pair (m,w) at  if they
prefer each other over their assigned partners; that is,m w µ(w) and w m µ(m). A matching is
stable if it is individually rational at  and it is not blocked by any pair (m,w) at . S() is the
set of all stable matchings under preference profile .
A centralized matching mechanism is an institution that receives reports of preferences from
all agents in the economy and produces a matching; formally, it is a mapping φ : P → M. The
notation φ()(i) = j means that j is i’s partner under mechanism φ when the reported preferences
are . The mechanism φ is commonly known.
A matching mechanism is stable if ∀ ∈ P , φ() ∈ S(). Gale and Shapley (1962) showed
that the set of stable matchings S() is non-empty for any one-to-one matching market. In doing
so, they introduced the deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) informally described below.
10For any i ∈M ∪W , −i= (j)j 6=i denotes the preferences of all agents except i.
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• Step 1. Every man makes an offer to their most preferred (acceptable) woman. Each woman
who receives more than one offer, tentatively holds on to her favorite (acceptable) one, and
rejects the rest.
• Step t. Each man who was rejected in step t − 1 makes an offer to his favorite (acceptable)
woman who has not rejected him yet. Each woman holds on to her favorite (acceptable) offer
among the ones received and the offer tentatively held if any, and rejects the rest.
The above description corresponds to the men-proposing DA (M -DA). The algorithm stops in
finitely many steps and the resulting outcome is the men-optimal stable matching. That is, every
man (weakly) prefers their assigned partner under this algorithm to the partner they would get in
any other stable matching. In an analogous manner one can define the women-proposing deferred
acceptance (W -DA), which outputs thewomen-optimal stablematching. The set of stablematchings
is known to present an opposition of interest across sides of the market; i.e. if men unanimously
agree that their outcome in stable matching µ, is preferable to another stable outcome µ′, then
women agree that they prefer µ′ over µ. Moreover, the set of unmatched agents is the same across
all stable matchings (McVitie and Wilson, 1970).
A matching mechanism φ is strategy-proof if it is a dominant strategy for every agent to report
their preferences truthfully in the direct revelation induced game. This means that every agent
cannot do better than to be honest, regardless of the actions of others, or beliefs. Formally, φ is
strategy-proof if ∀ ∈ P and ∀i ∈ M ∪W it holds that φ(i, ̃−i) i φ(′i, ̃−i), ∀ ′i,∀̃−i.
Strategy-proof for men requires the condition to hold only for men. The M -DA is strategy-proof
for men. That is, no matter what other men and women are reporting, a man cannot achieve a better
partner by misrepresenting his preferences than he gets by reporting them truthfully.
3.2. Domains
In the paper, the following two classes of stable mechanisms are considered: quantile-stable
mechanisms, and interior-stable mechanisms. The family of quantile-stable mechanism (also known
as generalized-medianmechanisms) is introduced and studied by Teo and Sethuraman (1998); Klaus
and Klijn (2006); Chen et al. (2014, 2016b), among others. The family of interior-stable mechanism
is introduced in this paper.
Definition 1 (Chen et al., 2014, 2016b). Let q ∈ [0, 1]. The q-quantile-stable matching mechanism
is the mapping {φq : P → M|µ : ∀m ∈ M, µ(m) is man m’s partner in his dkqe-th best stable
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matching according to order m, where k = |S()|}.11
An easy way to interpret quantile-stable mechanisms is to think about the stable set as the size of
a pie to be distributed between the set of men and set of women, and q ∈ [0, 1] as the share women
are going to get. Broadly speaking, by choosing q, the designer anchors the ex-post distribution
of payoffs across sides of the market, making it constant, regardless of other details such as the
number of participants in the market, or how they rank unacceptable alternatives.
The distribution of payoffs being constant across markets also implies that quantile-stable mech-
anisms are “easy to write,” since they can be completely described with one parameter q. This is
in the spirit of Wilson’s critique (Wilson, 1987), posing as a desideratum for a mechanism not to
depend on the fine details of the economy.12 A particular case is that of the median-stable matching
mechanism, (q = 1/2) which assigns each individual the partner they have in the median-preferred
stable matching. The median-stable matching mechanism appears as a compromise solution be-
tween the two side-optimal stable mechanisms. Median-stable matchings have been found to be
salient in decentralized two-sided matching problems (Echenique and Yariv, 2011). The family of
quantile-stable mechanism is the family of all such compromises.
Next, the family of interior-stable mechanisms is introduced. The denomination “interior” refers
to the fact that the mechanism selects a stable matching that is neither the side-optimal nor side-
pessimal stable matching, whenever it is possible.13 Thus, it makes a selection from the “interior”
of the lattice of stable matchings, with respect to the side-unanimous ordering.
Definition 2. A matching mechanism φ is interior-stable if for every preference profile where it
is possible the mechanism selects a stable matching that is not theM -optimal nor theM -pessimal
stable matching; i.e., (∀ : |S()| > 2)
[
φ() ∈ S() \ {φM(), φW ()}
]
.
Note that, in general, the class of quantile-stable mechanism and interior-stable mechanism are
logically independent. That is, neither one implies the other. Hence, interior-stable mechanisms
are picking up on a different type of compromise among stable matchings, across the sides of the
11For simplicity of exposition, and w.l.o.g., take d0e = 1 such that φ0(·) = φM (·); that isM -DA.
12To illustrate this point consider a mechanism that partitions the set of possible preference profiles into sets B and
C, such that φ() = φM () for ∈ B and φ() = φW () for ∈ C. This mechanism is stable since it always
coincides with one of the allocations that a DA would assign. However one might find this mechanism undesirable
since inessential changes in the reported preferences (e.g. rearranging the order among the alternatives in an agent’s
unacceptable set) can lead to large jumps in the distribution of payoffs across men and women.
13Interior-stable mechanisms coincide with the allocation prescribed by a DAmechanism only when the set of stable
matchings has one or two elements.
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market. While not quantifying it formally, the class of interior-stable mechanisms can be thought of
as quite a large family since the only restriction (not to coincide with DA when possible) is weak.
4. REGRET AND REGRET-FREE TRUTH-TELLING
In this section I introduce the notion of regret, and define what it means for a mechanism to
be regret-free truth-telling. I defer discussing the relation of regret-free truth-telling to existing
incentive compatibility notions to section 6, after having presented the main results of the paper.
Regret has been defined as “the emotion that we experience when realizing or imagining that
our current situation would have been better, if only we had decided differently” (Zeelenberg and
Pieters, 2007). There is evidence in the psychology and neuroscience literature that people have
regret, that fear of regret affects behavior, and that the effect of anticipated regret is related to
the information the subject knows will be revealed to her.14 Regret considerations, under different
definitions, have been used in other domains to explain overbidding in first price auctions (Filiz-
Ozbay and Ozbay, 2007), and to analyze robust monopoly pricing under uncertainty as well as
under ignorance (Bergemann and Schlag, 2008, 2011), among others.15 An action or strategy
being “regret-free” has also served as a justification for other equilibrium concepts such as ex-post
equilibria (Bergemann and Morris, 2008), and posterior equilibria (Green and Laffont, 1987).
In what follows I assume that each agent knows their own preference, but not that of others. After
the mechanism has generated a matching, the entire matching is observable to all agents, but the
reports given to the mechanism remain private. No ex-ante restriction is imposed on the possible
preferences of others. Alternative assumptions on the information that agents have ex-ante and what
they observe ex-post are discussed in section 5.3, together with the robustness of the results in these
environments.
Given a mechanism φ, and a matching market (M,W,), suppose agent i reports ′i, and
observes matching µ. Then i’s inference set, denoted I(µ;′i, φ) = {−i∈ P−i : φ(′i,−i) = µ},
identifies the preference reports that are consistent with the observed matching, given her report,
and the known rules of the mechanism.16 Player i knows that the reported preference profile must
be in this set.
14See Zeelenberg (1999, 2018), Connolly and Butler (2006), Bourgeois-Gironde (2010), and references therein.
15A wide ranging list of applications can be found in Stoye (2009), and Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007).
16If participants had any additional information ex-ante or ex-post, then one would refine the inference set appropri-
ately to reflect it.
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Definition 3. Given a mechanism φ and an observed matching µ, agent i regrets reporting ′i if
there is an alternative report ′′i such that
(i) for each −i∈ I(µ;′i, φ) it holds that [φ(′′i ,−i) i µ]; and,
(ii) for some ̃−i ∈ I(µ;′i, φ) it holds that [φ(′′i , ̃−i) i µ].
Agent i regrets reporting ′i because she knows ex-post that her report is weakly dominated; i.e.
agent i knows that the reported preference profile lies within the inference set and, furthermore,
there exists an alternative report that would have resulted in either matching her to the same or a
strictly preferred partner.
Definition 4. Given a mechanism φ, a report ′i is regret-free for agent i, if it is not possible for
i to regret ′i; i.e. there is no matching µ that i could observe after reporting ′i such that there is
an alternative report ′′i , that makes her regret reporting ′i.
A regret-free report guarantees agents that they will never face regret. As such, it appears as a
stringent criterion, since it does not take into account how “likely” these matchings where regret
obtains are to occur. In this regard, two remarks are in order. First, this is precisely one of the
strengths of the notion, since it is does not depend on fine details of the beliefs, in the spirit of
Wilson (1987); particularly given the difficulty in practice of establishing objective probabilities in
the type of two-sided environments under consideration. Moreover, standard and familiar notions
use the same type of criteria. For example, dominant strategy incentive compatibility requires that
reporting truthfully is weakly better than any other report for every possible report others could
make (regardless of the likelihood that they will effectively use such report). Second, section 5.3
shows that the results do not hinge on knife-edge cases; i.e. on matchings or reports that are
“unlikely” or implausible to obtain in practice.
Definition 5. A mechanism φ is regret-free truth-telling if for every market, and every agent,
truth-telling is regret-free.
5. RESULTS
Section 5.1 discusses the results pertaining to one-to-one matching markets. It first establishes
that DA is regret-free truth-telling (section 5.1.1). It then goes on to show that DA is characterized
by regret-free truth-telling in the context of quantile-stable mechanisms, and that no interior-stable
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mechanism can satisfy regret free-truth-telling (section 5.1.2). The analysis pertaining to many-to-
one markets is presented in section 5.2, where it is shown that the program-proposing DA does not
satisfy regret-free truth-telling. Lastly, section 5.3 discusses the informational limits of the results.
The issues underlying these results relate the matching mechanism to: (i) the inferences agents
can make based on what they can observe; (ii) the shape that profitable misrepresentations must
take when it is profitable to misrepresent; and (iii) how those same misrepresentations fare when it
is not profitable to manipulate.
5.1. One-to-one matching
5.1.1. Deferred acceptance
In this section I show that the DA (both men- and women-proposing) provides incentives to
report truthfully to agents on both sides of the market if they want to avoid regret. The incentives
are strict in the sense that truth is found to be the unique regret-free report in DA (Proposition 1).
Proofs are relegated to appendix A.1.
Theorem 1. The deferred acceptance mechanism is regret-free truth-telling.
The reasons why no agent ever regrets truth-telling to a clearinghouse that uses DA are different
across the sides of the markets, as the discussion of many-to-one markets (section 5.2) makes clear.
For agents on the proposing side, the DA provides dominant-strategy incentives to report their
preferences truthfully (Dubins and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982). It follows immediately that truth
cannot become dominated ex-post, and that they cannot regret truth-telling. For an agent on the
receiving side of the mechanism, the result stems from the following two observations. First, the
way that DA is manipulated when possible requires the agent to use reports (e.g. truncations) that
typically lead to detrimental outcomes when her observed partner is her best achievable partner.
Second, given the matching that the agent observes after truthfully reporting her preferences, she
cannot ever reject the hypothesis that her observed partner is her best achievable partner. Together,
these observations imply that the information revealed by observing the outcome of DAmechanism
is not sufficient for an agent to to pin down a misrepresentation that would make them regret
truth-telling.
I briefly illustrate the argument by considering the medical match example from section 2,
in which there are two doctors Alice and Bob, and two hospitals City and General with one
vacancy each, and where the clearinghouse usesH-DA. Alice prefers General to City, to remaining
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unemployed. Suppose that she reports her preferences truthfully. The set of matchings that she can
expect to result can be divided into the ones that Alice is matched with her top choice (General),
those in which shematches to her last acceptable choice (City), and those in which she is unmatched.
Clearly if, after being honest, Alice matches to her top choice (General), there is no room for
her to regret truth-telling. Similarly, when Alice does not match after reporting her preferences
truthfully, there is no other report that she could have provided in which she could have matched
her to an acceptable partner. Thus, no matching that fits those descriptions can ever lead to Alice
regretting reporting her preferences truthfully.
The only possible circumstance in which Alice could regret truth-telling is one in which she
matches to her worst acceptable choice (City). Moreover, the only alternative report that could
(potentially) lead her to regret truth-telling in this example is a truncation, where she would only
list General as acceptable.
In this circumstance, since Alice is honest and does not match with her top choice (General), she
infers (due to the stability of DA) that either General finds her unacceptable or that General prefers
Bob over her. However, she is unable to determine whether Bob has reported to have the same
preferences as her, or the reverse preferences. As argued in section 2, while in the latter case the
truncation could have potentially led to a strictly better outcome for her, it is also possible (in the
former) that it would have led to a strictly detrimental outcome for her. Therefore, after being honest
and matching to City, Alice cannot conclude that a truncation dominates truth-telling ex-post.
Thus, having ruled out all possible ex-post matchings and alternative reports that could make
Alice regret truth-telling, it follows that Alice does not regret truth-telling.
The following proposition shows that in the DA truth-telling is the unique regret-free report. Thus
obtaining truthful reports from all agents is not a consequence of making the behavioral criterion
(regret) arbitrarily coarse (for instance compared to strategy-proofness). If so, not only truth-telling,
but other reports would also be regret-free.
Proposition 1. Truth is the essentially unique regret-free report in the DA mechanism. Moreover,
an agent regrets any other report through truth.
The qualifier “essentially” refers to the existence of regret-free reports that are essentially equiv-
alent to truth-telling; i.e. those that differ from it only in how they rank the alternatives in the
unacceptable set.
When the centralized clearinghouse uses DA, for any agent, and any possible misrepresentation,
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there are (non-knife-edge) scenarios where the agent regrets misrepresenting her preferences, and
does so because reporting truthfully dominates the misrepresentation. As previously mentioned,
any misrepresentation that can be a profitable manipulation of the DA, is such that it typically
leads to detrimental outcomes when her best achievable partner is the partner she would obtain
under truth-telling. When such detrimental outcome of a misrepresentation obtains the agent posses
sufficient information to pin down that truth-telling dominates the misrepresentation ex-post. Thus,
in order to regret a misrepresentation, the agent only needs to bear in mind truth-telling, and not
necessarily some other complex reports.
The example in section 2 illustrates these forces. The example shows that if an agent performs a
truncation, and observes an outcomewhere she is unmatched, then the agent regrets the truncation.17
Particularly, she regrets truncating by considering the outcomes that would have been generated if
she had told the truth. Ruling out truncations is not sufficient in the present environment. However,
the basic forces behind the result are the same for other types of misrepresentations. The arguments
are presented in appendix A.1.
5.1.2. Quantile-stable and interior-stable mechanisms.
Having argued that the DA is regret-free truth-telling, I now show that no other quantile stable
mechanism satisfies regret-free truth-telling (Theorem 2). Thus regret-free truth-telling charac-
terizes the DA among quantile-stable mechanisms (Corollary 1). Moreover, it is shown that no
interior-stable mechanism (see Definition 2) satisfies regret-free truth-telling (Theorem 3). Al-
though the class of interior- and quantile-stable mechanisms are logically independent, the results
are presented in immediate succession since the same reasoning underlies them. The proofs are
relegated to appendix A.2.
Theorem 2. Let φq be the q-quantile-stable mechanism, where q ∈ (0, 1). Then φq is not regret-
free truth-telling.
Corollary 1. A mechanism is a quantile-stable regret-free truth-telling mechanism if and only if
it is (either the men- or women-proposing) deferred acceptance mechanism.
Theorem 3. Let φ be an interior-stable mechanism. Then φ is not regret-free truth-telling.
17It is also worth noting that the argument in general does not depend on the detrimental outcome being unemploy-
ment.
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Given an observed matching that has been generated by a stable mechanism, it continues to be
true that an agent can never reject the hypothesis that her observed partner is her best achievable
partner. However, for these classes of mechanisms (quantile- and interior-stable), the shape that
some specific misrepresentations (referred to as soft-truncations) take when profitable is such that
these misrepresentations do not ever lead to detrimental outcomes when the observed partner is
the best achievable partner. This means that observing the resulting matching provides sufficient
information for agents to find reports that dominate truth-telling ex-post, and hence can lead to an
agent to regret truth-telling.
In these soft-truncations the agent reports truthfully her preferences among alternatives in the
weak upper-contour set of observed matched partner, and declares all other alternatives as unac-
ceptable. While a soft-truncation is of no consequence for the agent when the clearinghouse uses
DA (i.e. would return the same match as being honest always), this is not the case for other stable
mechanisms, such as quantile- and interior-stable.
To illustrate the argument I provide an example where an agent regrets truth-telling in the
context of the median-stable mechanism. The proof for general quantile-stable, and interior-stable
mechanisms can be found in the appendix A.2.
Example 1 (regretting truth in the median-stable mechanism). Consider a matching market with
|M | = |W | = 5, and let w1’s preferences be
w1 : m1,m2,m3,m4,m5.
Suppose that w1 reports her preferences honestly to a clearinghouse that uses the median stable
mechanism (q = 1/2) to generate matchings, and that she observes the matching:
φ(w1 , ·) =
w1 w2 w3 w4 w5
m3 m2 m1 m4 m5
 = µ.
I claim that w1 regrets truth-telling when she observes µ, and she does so through the alternative
report:
′w1 : m1,m2,m3.
I proceed in two steps. In step 1, I argue that, under the alternative report ′w1 , w1 would obtain
a matching that is weakly better than her observed one from being honest (m3) for any reports of
15
others in w1’s inference set; thus satisfying condition (i) of the regret definition. In step 2, I argue
that, under the alternative ′w1 , w1 would obtain a matching that is strictly better than her observed
one from being honest (m3) for some reports of others in w1’s inference; thus satisfying condition
(ii) of the regret definition.
Step 1. Since a median-stable mechanism depends on the entire set of stable matchings, it is
important to see how the latter would change if w1’s report would be the soft-truncation ′w1 .
The following lemma says that any stable matching when w1 reports the soft-truncation ′w1 is
also a stable matching when w1 reports her preferences truthfully w1 , for any set of reports of
others in w1’s inference set. This provides crucial information about what the stable set would look
like under each type of report, and consequently about what matching would be implemented under
each report. In fact, the stable matchings under the soft-truncation are exactly those that are stable
when she reports truthfully and that are weakly preferred by w1 to µ.
Lemma 1. ∀ −w1∈ I(µ;w1 , φq),
S(′w1 ,−w1) = {µ
′ ∈ S(w1 ,−w1) : µ′ w1 µ = φq()}.
Corollary 2. φq(′w1 ,−w1) w1 φ
M(′w1 ,−w1) = φ
q(w1 ,−w1).
The women-pessimal stable matching thatM -DA would produce underw1’s soft-truncation′w1
must be the same as the one the median-stable mechanism produces when w1 reports truthfully. In
terms of the example, it means w1 must be getting m3 as her assigned partner inM -DA when she
reports ′w1 , which coincides with her assigned partner in the median matching when reporting
w1 . Thus, the lemma has the key implication that ex-post w1 knows she would not have obtained a
detrimental outcome by using the soft-truncation′w1 instead of reporting her preferences truthfully
w1 .
Step 2. It remains to be shown that for some report of others in the inference set, reporting ′w1
would generate a matching that is strictly preferred by w1 to µ; i.e.′w1 satisfies condition (ii) from
the regret definition at µ.
By performing a soft-truncation w1 forces the mechanism to calculate the median with respect
to a set that contains only weakly preferred matchings to the one obtained through truth-telling. I
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show that in fact the median over this set selects a partner for w1 that she strictly prefers.




















Under profile∗ there are exactly five stablematchings, linearly ordered according to the unanimous
preferences of either side, and such that in every stable matching every agent is assigned a different
stable partner.18 One can verify that the preference profile ∗ is in w1’s inference set when she
observes µ being the outcome of the median-stable mechanism. By lemma 1 it follows that,
under the soft-truncation, the median-stable mechanism selects the partner associated with each





Then, ′w1 satisfies condition (ii) of the definition of regret at µ.
Step 1. and 2. together imply that, given her inference set after reporting truthfully and observing
µ,w1 knows she would have done at least as well by reporting′w1 as by reportingw1; additionally,
she knows there exists reports consistent with the observed matching where the report ′w1 would
have yielded a strictly preferred matching to the one obtained by truth-telling. Thus, when the
clearinghouse uses the median-stable mechanism, w1 regrets truth-telling w1 when she observes
matching µ, by considering the outcomes that would have resulted from the soft-truncation ′w1 .
The same argument can be extended to quantile-stable mechanisms in general, as shown in appendix
A.2.
Theorems 2 and 3 show that a mechanism being regret-free truth-telling is not a necessary
consequence of stability, but moreover, they help distinguish DA from other stable matching
mechanism. In this sense, they help rationalize the exclusive adoption of DA mechanisms (among
18These are referred to as Latin square preferences following Hwang (1978, 1986). They have the property that no
two women rank the same man in the same position, and men rank women in their mirror image; i.e. if w1’s top choice
ism1, thenm1 ranks w1 last.
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stable mechanisms) in practice. The feature that DA provides incentives to agents on both sides of
the market to report their preferences truthfully, where other stable matching mechanisms do not,
contrasts with the results of the large/unbalanced markets approach, where all stable mechanisms
appear to provide the same incentives to agents, as well as the insightful contributions by Pathak
and Sönmez (2013) and Chen et al. (2016a) where the authors define notions to compare the
vulnerability of stable mechanisms to manipulation, and show that no two stable mechanisms can
be ranked in terms of manipulability for all agents. In a loose sense, the key distinction with respect
to the latter approach is that their manipulability comparisons across mechanisms allows agents
to tailor their manipulations to the true preference profile, which would be akin to letting them
leverage an underlying complete information structure.
5.2. Many-to-one matching
In the context of many-to-one matching markets, which is ubiquitous in practice, the next
theorem shows that only the doctor-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm satisfies regret-free
truth-telling for all agents.19 The result strengths the negative conclusion of Roth (1985) which
showed that theH-DA is not strategy-proof for hospitals by establishing that in theH-DA hospitals
regret truth-telling. On the other hand, the result also presents a positive counterpart to Roth (1985)’s
impossibility result regarding the existence of a strategy-proof mechanism for hospitals, due to the
weakening of the incentive constraints to be regret-free truth-telling. The result also complements
the strands of literature regarding large/unbalanced markets.20
The intuition behind the result can be traced back to the asymmetry of inferences that agents
on each side of the market can make based on the observed matching, and the known fact that a
hospital with multi-unit capacity may be competing excessively within side, or competing against
themselves through their multiple positions (see e.g. Sönmez, 1997, 1999).
Theorem 4. φ is a quantile-stable and regret-free truth-telling mechanisms if and only if φ is the
doctor-proposing deferred acceptance.
Given that preferences of hospitals are assumed to be responsive, the logic and proof of why
truth-telling is regret-free in the doctor-proposing deferred acceptance for all agents follows the
19The many-to-one environment under consideration corresponds to the classic college admissions problem of Gale
and Shapley (1962), and is therefore omitted. Hospitals are assumed to have responsive preferences (Roth, 1985),
meaning that preferences over sets of doctors are consistent with how they rank doctors individually. In practice, the
NRMP elicits responsive reports of preferences.
20See footnote 7.
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same steps as Theorem 1, and is thus omitted. Adapting the example from Roth (1985) and Sönmez
(1997) to account for the information structure, we obtain the negative result.
Example 2 (Hospital regrets truth-telling in H-DA). There are three hospitals {1, 2, 3} with
respective capacities (2, 1, 1), and four doctors {A,B,C,D}. Hospital 1’s (responsive) preferences
are given by 1: A,B,C,D. Consider the case where hospital 1 reports its preferences truthfully,
and observes that the outcome of the H-DA is:
φH(1, ·) =
 1 2 3
{C,D} B A
 = µ.
The following preference profile ̂−1 is in 1’s inference set.
q
2 1: A,B,C,D
1 ̂2 : A,B,C,D
1 ̂3 : C,A,B,D
̂A : 3, 1, 2
̂B : 2, 1, 3
̂C : 1, 3, 2
̂D : 1, 2, 3
Under µ, hospital 1 is filling both slots with their least desirable candidates. If the reports of others
are ̂−1, then the outcome comes about due to an excessive within-side competition. Hospital 1’s
second vacancy generates a chain of rejections, that makes hospital 1 lose the ability to land doctor
A, as well as doctor B.21 Had hospital 1 reported ′1: B,D,C,A then the result would have been
φH(′1, ̂−1) =
 1 2 3
{B,D} A C

which is strictly better according to 1’s true preferences. This preferable outcome follows from
reducingwithin-side competition, thus avoiding the rejection chain. Crucially, themisrepresentation
of hospital 1’s preferences ′1 does not decrease the ranking of doctors that hospital 1 matched to
under µ.
Since hospital 1 is matched to its last acceptable candidatesC,D under truth-telling, the only way
21Hospital 1’s first vacancy displaces hospital 2 from matching with doctor A, while its second vacancy eventually
displaces hospital 3 from matching with doctor C. These in turn displace hospital 1 from obtaining either doctor A or
B.
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that the misrepresentation ′1 could leave hospital 1 worse is by producing a match in which one
(or both) positions remain vacant. However, given that ′1 lists all doctors as acceptable any such
matching would be blocked by the either doctors C or D and hospital 1, which would contradict
the stability of H-DA. Hence, the outcome under the misrepresentation ′1 is weakly preferred by
hospital 1 to the observed matching µ for any set of report of others −1 in 1’s inference set.
Thus, hospital 1 regrets truth-telling (1) after observing matching µ by considering the alter-
native report ′1.
The preceding analysis tackled the case of manipulation via preferences. However, Sönmez
(1997) showed that stable mechanisms are also vulnerable to manipulation via capacities in the
many-to-one matching environment. For the sake of brevity, I state the following result on regret-
free truth-telling in regards to manipulation via capacities, and defer its discussion and proof to the
appendix A.3.
Theorem 5. If φ is the doctor-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism, then φ is regret-free
truth-telling for doctors, and reporting the true capacities is regret-free for hospitals. On the other
hand, if φ is the hospital-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism, a hospital can regret reporting
the true capacity.
5.3. Information Limits
The concept of regret introduced in this paper needs to account to the structure of information
and feedback given to players, since the behavior supported as regret-free changes with these. The
following examples address the extent to which the results are robust to different informational
assumptions. Example 3 shows that both incomplete information, and limited feedback play an
important role in making the deferred acceptance regret-free truth-telling. Example 4 illustrates
that reasonable degrees of uncertainty suffice to make truth-telling regret-free in DA.
Example 3 (Complete information ex-ante). Consider a clearinghouse that uses M -DA. There
are two men and two women with preferences given by:
m1 : w1, w2
m2 : w2, w1
w1 : m2,m1
w2 : m1,m2
In this case, there is no uncertainty regarding others’ preferences, but only strategic uncertainty
regarding what they report to the clearinghouse. Suppose that w1 reports her preferences truthfully,
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Assuming w1 knows that men do not play weakly dominated strategies, then w1’s inference
set is degenerate, and coincides with the true preference profile. Since it presents multiple stable
matchings, it follows that w1 has (and knows that it has) a profitable manipulation. Thus w1 would
regret truth-telling when observing µ = φM() by considering the outcome that would result from
the truncation w′1 : m2.22
Remark (Complete information ex-post). If the mechanism were to reveal the entire set of
messages that gave rise to the observed matching, again, the inference set of agents would be
degenerate, even if there was ex-ante incomplete information. Thus, whenever the set of reports is
associated with a non-singleton stable set, there is an agent that regrets their report.
Theorem 1 shows that DA is regret-free truth-telling in an environment where agents have
incomplete information about others’ preferences. In contrast, example 3 shows that, under complete
information, the DA can lead to agents (on the receiving side) to regret truth-telling. The natural
question that follows is: How much uncertainty is needed to achieve the result? I partially answer
this question in the context of the previous example, in the form of sufficient conditions.
Example 4 (Sufficient uncertainty). If, in addition to the preferences described in example 3, w1
believes that it is possible that either (i) woman w2 shares her preference (′w2 : m2,m1); or that,
(ii) either man only find their favorite woman as acceptable (′m1 : w1; 
′
m2
: w2), then truth-telling
is regret-free for w1.
In order to manipulate theM -DA when profitable, w1 would have to truncate her preferences, by
not listing m1. However, in any of the other cases that w1 believes to be possible there is a unique
stable matching, and in this matching w1’s partner is m1. Hence, in any such case, the truncation
would lead to a strictly worse outcome, by leaving w1 unmatched.
Truth-telling is regret-free for w1, as long as she believes it to be possible that her observed
partner is her best attainable partner.
22One should also note that truth-telling can be regret-free under complete information, whenever there is a unique
stable matching with respect to the true preference profile.
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6. DISCUSSION
The notion of regret-free truth-telling introduced in this paper is a weaker than that of strategy-
proofness. It is also weaker than ex-post incentive compatibility, given the known equivalence
between the latter and strategy-proofness in revelation games under private values. Still, one can
readily see that the notion of regret-free is in the spirit of robust mechanism design. Concepts like
ex-post and posterior equilibria have been justified on the grounds of satisfying some (undefined)
notion of “no regret” or being “regret-free.” Ex-post incentive compatibility requires truth-telling
to be optimal ex-post, that is even if the agent learns the true type and actions of all other agents.
Posterior equilibria imposes a similar yet weaker requirement, that truth-telling remains optimal
even if the agent is to learn only the actions of others; but not necessarily their types. Regret-free
truth-telling requires the action to remain undominated given the information that the agent has
ex-post, which includes their ex-ante information, as well as all the informational feedback that the
mechanism provides.
The definition of regret presented in this paper is by no means the only possible one. Since
the literature on regret is too vast to survey here, instead, I address the prominent notion of
minimizing maximum regret in the sense of Savage (1951).23,24 For example, the literature on
robust mechanism design has used minimizing maximum regret to study robust monopoly pricing,
and monopoly pricing under ignorance (Bergemann and Schlag, 2008, 2011). Under this notion an
individual computes her regret as the difference in outcomes between what would have been the
optimal action at the true state of the world and the action she takes (see Bell, 1982). This requires a
knowledge of the true preference profile at the end of the game which is absent in the setup analyzed
in this paper, since in most matching applications privacy concerns prevent this sort of information
revelation. Moreover, minimizing maximum regret requires cardinal information, both absent in
this paper’s setup, as well as in the data that is elicited from participants of these matching markets.
The report that would minimize an agent’s maximum regret in the sense of Savage (1951) does not
generally coincide with a regret-free report for that agent.
It should also be noted that regret and the implied regret-minimization presented in this paper
is different from worst-case minimization. For example, in the context of matching markets, under
23Milnor (1954) provides a prior-less axiomatization, while Hayashi et al. (2008) and Stoye (2011) deal with the
multi-priors as well as other criteria. Sarver (2008) axiomatizes anticipated regret in the context choice over menus of
lotteries.
24This notion is widely used both in statistical decision theory, treatment choice, and computer science; see Manski
(2007); Stoye (2009); Halpern and Pass (2012) and references therein.
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worst-case minimization, the agent expects to remain unmatched irrespective of her report in a
stable mechanism. Therefore, she is indifferent among all reports that do not list unacceptable
options as acceptable.
Worst-case minimization is regularly considered in the context of decision making under igno-
rance. Other related concepts are leximin preferences, protective strategies, and prudent strategies
(Barberà and Jackson, 1988; Moulin, 1981). Barberà and Dutta (1995) introduce the notion of
protective strategies and show that truth-telling is the unique protective strategy equilibrium in
the revelation game associated with the deferred acceptance, both with and without transfers. The
concept of protective strategies is a refinement of worst-case minimization. Two strategies that have
the same worst outcome are distinguished by their 2nd-worst outcome; if the latter coincides, then
they are that distinguished by the 3rd-worst outcome, etc. Under certain information structures, the
regret-free criterion and protective strategies coincide, however, in general these two criteria are dis-
tinct. For instance, in a complete information environment (such as the one depicted in Example 3)
truth-telling is a protective strategy for any participant of the DA, but it is not regret-free.
7. RELATED LITERATURE
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it contributes to understanding the
incentives DA provides for truth-telling, and distinguishing mechanisms by their susceptibility
they are to manipulation. Second, it contributes to the literature on robust mechanism design and
decision making under ignorance. Third, it contributes to the recent and emerging literature on
market design with non-standard preferences and behavioral considerations.
Dubins and Freedman (1981), and Roth (1982) show that there exists no stable strategy-proof
mechanism. Moreover, Pathak and Sönmez (2013) and Chen et al. (2016a) define notions of a
mechanism being more manipulable than another, and show that stable mechanisms cannot be
ranked by their manipulability for all agents. Based on these observations it would seem we are
left with multiple stable mechanisms and no clear way of choosing among them in terms of their
incentives for truthful reporting. This paper identifies incentives that DA provides agents to report
truthfully that are not provided by any other quantile- or interior-stable mechanism.
Roth (1989), Roth and Rothblum (1999), and Ehlers (2008) look at the problem of incentives in
DA from the Bayesian point of view, where expected utility maximizing participants have (common
prior) beliefs over each other’s preferences. Roth (1989) shows that it is possible that no Bayes-
Nash equilibrium of the DA induced revelation game supports a matching outcome that is stable
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with respect to the true preferences. Looking to provide advice to participants, Roth and Rothblum
(1999) show that truncation strategies first order stochastically dominate other misrepresentations
under a symmetry conditions on priors. However, no clear order between truncation strategies and
truth-telling emerges. Ehlers (2008) shows that the symmetry condition of Roth and Rothblum
(1999) is stringent.
Using data from the NRMP, Roth and Peranson (1999) show that only a small set of doctors
and hospitals receive different assignments under D-DA and H-DA; often referred to as a “small
core.” Aided by simulation results, they conjecture that the large size of the NRMP market explains
why the core is small. Building on these observations, an insightful literature emerged that show
that as the market grows large or unbalanced, the core of the market shrinks (in an appropriate
sense). Under the assumption of limited acceptability, Immorlica and Mahdian (2005), and Kojima
and Pathak (2009) show that only a vanishing fraction of the market has incentives to deviate
from a truth-telling equilibrium, for one-to-one and many-to-one matching markets respectively.
Lee (2017) dispenses with limited acceptability by using techniques from random matrices, and
shows that truth-telling by all agents can be supported as an approximate equilibrium. On the other
hand, Coles and Shorrer (2014) establishes that, absent bounds on the (random) cardinal utilities,
agents on the receiving side of the DA may still have large incentives to truncate their preferences
significantly, even in large markets. Azevedo and Budish (2019) introduce the concept of strategy-
proofness in the large, and showed many well-known mechanisms (the DA among them) across
different environments satisfy this property.25 In a striking result, Ashlagi et al. (2017) show that
small imbalances on the number of agents in each side, lead to the core shrinking rapidly, and show
that a truth-telling equilibria can be supported as an approximate optimal strategy for all agents.
The present paper complements this literature in several ways. First, the main results hold
irrespective of the size of the market.26 Second, a stable matching outcome is sustained as the
unique prediction under regret-free behavior when the clearinghouse uses DA.27,28 Third, the
approach in this paper recognizes incentives being provided by the DA that are not provided by other
25Strategy-proofness in the large is a weakening of strategy-proofness in two respects: first, it requires truth-telling
to be approximately optimal; and second, to do so with respect to all full-support i.i.d distributions of play.
26Through simulations, Kadam (2014) shows that the number of participants needed for the results of Kojima and
Pathak (2009) to hold can be unreasonably large in practice. Moreover, not all markets that use DA are large. For
instance, while the NRMP has participants in the tens of thousands, the number of graduating rabbinical students is in
the hundreds.
27Fernandez et al. (2020) show that, in the context of incomplete information matching from a Bayesian perspective,
even a singleton core state-by-state, is not sufficient to guarantee that only the stablematching is supported inBayes-Nash
equilibria.
28In the implementation literature this is referred to as full implementation.
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stable mechanisms. Forth, the insights do carry over to many-to-one markets in a straightforward
fashion.29 Fifth, the incentives provided do not depend on the specification of cardinal utilities, nor
on details about beliefs or priors, beyond their support.30,31
The treatment in this paper maintains the ordinal preference approach tradition in matching and
looks for incentives in the spirit of the “Wilson doctrine” and robust mechanism (Ledyard, 1977;
Bergemann and Morris, 2008).32 As discussed, regret-free truth-telling depends on the support of
beliefs (and not their distribution). The notion only considers ordinal information, sincemechanisms
in practice elicit ordinal, and not cardinal preferences. The notion further accounts for the structure
of information that participants typically have in practice, both ex-ante as well as ex-post. This is
in line with the arguments supporting ex-post and posterior equilibria (see section 6).
This paper also contributes to the recent and emerging literature incorporating non-standard
preferences and behavioral aspects to realms of mechanism and market design.33 Specifically
within matching, Meisner and vonWangenheim (2019), and Dreyfuss et al. (2019) analyze parents’
behavior in the context of school choice through the lenses of loss aversion; Antler and Bachi
(2019) look at two-sided search and matching when agents reasoning is coarse; Pan (2019) studies
matching with overconfident agents in the context of school choice; Troyan and Morrill (2020)
develop a notion of (non-)obviously manipulable and show that several known mechanism, satisfy
this property.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS
A.1. One-to-one matching: Deferred acceptance
Theorem 1. The deferred acceptance mechanism is regret-free truth-telling; i.e. if φ ∈ {φM , φW}
then ∀(M,W,), ∀i ∈ N =M ∪W , i is regret-free.
The result is established through four claims: Claim 1 shows that truth-telling is regret-free for
the proposing side, which is a consequence of dominant strategy incentive compatibility (Dubins
and Freedman, 1981; Roth, 1982). Consequently the rest of the proof focuses only on the receiving
side. Claim 2, 3 and 4 show that there does not exist a report through which i regrets truth-telling.
Each claim deals with reports that differ from the truth-telling in a specific manner. Claim 2 shows
that changing the order of alternatives that are preferred to the observed match is inconsequential;
it would not change the resulting matching. Claim 3 and 4 show that any report that differs from
truth-telling in a consequential manner is never a “safe deviation” compared truth-telling, in the
sense that whenever it may result in a more preferable match it may also result in a less preferable
as well. Claim 3 deals with those deviations where an alternative which is less preferred to the
observed match by the true preference profile is reported as preferred to the said match. Claim 4
deals with deviations where the relative order between two alternatives that are less preferred to the
observed match is reversed. All reports that differ from the truth in a consequential manner have to
fit into the conditions of (at least) one of these claims.
Proof: Let (M,W,) be an arbitrary matching market, and let the mechanism be the M -DA.
Given an arbitrary agent i and an arbitrary matching µ, define
UCiφ()(i) = {j ∈ J : j i φ()(i)},
LCiφ()(i) = {j ∈ J : φ()(i) i j}.
That is, UCiφ()(i) denotes the (strict) upper contour set with respect to φ()(i) under i, that is
the set of partners that player i considers strictly preferable (according to his/her true preference)
to the partner under φ(); analogously interpret LCiφ()(i).
Claim 1. Truth-telling is regret-free for every agent in the proposing side.
Claim 1 follows directly from strategy-proofness for men of the M -DA. Consequently we can
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focus on the receiving side (so i ∈ W from now on). We must show that for an arbitrary agent
on the receiving side and for an arbitrary matching that may result from her reporting her true
preference, there is no alternative report through which that agent regrets truth-telling. We start by
showing (Claim 2) that a report that differs from truth only in the way that it orders elements that
are preferred to the observed matching cannot yield a better matching for the agent.
Claim 2. Let µ ∈ {µ′ : (∃ −i∈ P−i) [φ(i,−i) = µ′]} be an arbitrary matching that results
from i truth-telling. For any report ′i such that





∀a, b ∈ LCiφ()(i) ∪ {φ()(i)}
)
[a ′i b⇔ a i b]
it holds that φ(i,−i) = φ(′i,−i)
The agent does not reject an offer under ′i that was accepted under i, she cannot affect the set
of offers that are made to her, and consequently cannot affect the outcome favorably.34
Claim 3. Suppose ∃(′i, ̂−i) such that
1. ∃̂−i ∈ I(µ;i, φM)
2. ′i: ∃j̃ ∈ LC
i
φ()(i) and j̃ ∈ UC
′i
φ()(i)
3. φ(′i, ̂−i) i φ(i, ̂−i) = µ
then ∃̃−i ∈ I(µ;i, φM) such that φ(i, ̃−i) = µ i φ(′i, ̃−i).
Case 1. Truncation (j̃ = i) It is enough to consider the following preference profile to see that
the truncation can leave the agent worse off than telling the truth
̃k : φ()(k), k, . . . ∀k 6= i
Notice that in profile ̃k everyone other than i considers their assigned partner as their unique
acceptable partner, this profile belongs to i’s inference set. However under ′i that match is no
longer acceptable for i. Since φ is stable with respect to the reported preferences (in particular
individually rational) it leaves i unmatched under ′i, which is a strictly worse off outcome from
the point of view of i’s the true preferences.
34Agent i did not receive any offer from a member of UCiφ()(i) in φ() by construction of the DA. The first round
offersmade bymen are unaffected by i’s report. Since agent i’s offers are the same (and belong toLCiφ()(i)∪{φ()(i)})
and her preferences over those alternatives did not change, the set of active agents in the next round is the same. The
set of active agents in the second round is the same, again she faces choices on LCiφ()(i) ∪ {φ()(i)}, and makes the
same choice. The argument follows by induction.
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Case 2. A non-truncation (j̃ 6= i). Similar to the truncation case it is enough to consider the
following profile, which is in i’s inference set
̃j̃ :i, φ()(j̃), j̃, . . .
̃k :φ()(k), k, . . . ∀k 6= {j̃, i}
Under the alternative report, everyone except i has the same preference profile as before, so first
round proposals are the same. However, under′i agent j̃ is declared as preferred to φ()(i), which
means that agent i accepts j̃’s offer. Since there are no more active players the algorithm stops
and matches agent i to j̃ which is a strictly worse outcome under i’s true preference profile, that
is φ(i, ̃−i)(i) = φ()(i) i j̃ = φ(′i, ̃−i)(i). Consequently, i cannot regret truth-telling (i)
through a deviation (′i) consistent with the claim, at the observed matching (µ) in DA.
Claim 4. Suppose ∃(′i, ̂−i) such that
1. φ(i, ̂−i) = µ
2. ′i: ∃u, v ∈ LC
i
φ()(i) such that u i v and v ′i u
3. φ(′i, ̂−i) i φ(i, ̂−i)
then ∃̃−i such that φ(i, ̃−i) = µ and φ(i, ̃−i) i φ(′i, ̃−i).
The structure of the argument follows the same lines as the previous claim. For any report ′i
that satisfies the conditions of the claim, the following preference profile (̃−i) is in i’s inference
set:
̃v :i, φ()(v), . . .
̃u :i, φ()(u), . . .
̃φ()(v) :v, φ()(i), . . .
̃φ()(i) :φ()(v), i, . . .
̃k :φ()(k), k, . . . ∀k 6= {i, u, v, φ()(i), φ()(v)}
If i reports ′i instead, the resulting allocation matches i to v, which is a worse outcome for agent i
according to her true preference profile, that is φ(i, ̃−i)(i) i v = φ(′i, ̃−i)(i). Consequently,
i cannot regret truth-telling (i) through a deviation (′i) consistent with the claim, at the observed
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matching (µ) given that the clearinghouse usesM -DA.
The analysis shows that there is no misrepresenting report through which agent i can regret
truth-telling, given µ. Since this was done for an arbitrary µ, it holds for all such matchings that
may result from truth-telling. Consequently, there is no µ at which i regrets truth-telling which
means truth-telling is regret-free for agent i. Since this conclusion holds for an arbitrary agent in
either side of the market (proposing or receiving), putting together the previous claims the theorem
is established. 
Let Ti = {′′i∈ Pi : (∀a, b ∈ Ai(i) ∪ {i}) [Ai(′′i ) = Ai(i) and a ′′i b⇔ a i b]} denote
the set of all preferences for i that only differ from the true one in how they rank unacceptable
choices between themselves. Note that, by construction, the DA does not take into account the
relative ranking among alternatives in the unacceptable set of any agent; these reports differ from
the truth only in an inessential manner. Thus, the matching generated by truth-telling and by any
report in Ti is the same; corollary 3 follows.
Corollary 3. Any report that differs from the truth only in how it ranks the elements of the
unacceptable set among themselves (′i∈ Ti) is also regret-free.
Proposition 1. Truth is the essentially unique regret-free report in the DA mechanism. Moreover,
i regrets any other report through truth.
Proof: Any meaningful misrepresentation of an agent i’s preferences ′i∈ Pi \ Ti must belong
to one of the following cases:
1. ′i∈ Pi such that ∃k ∈ A(i) and k ∈ U(′i).
2. ′i∈ Pi such that ∃j ∈ Ui(i) and j ∈ Ai(′i).
3. ′i involves a permutation among the acceptable set.
To see that any misreport of the form of 1 can lead to regret, it is enough to consider a resulting
matching φ(′i, ·) where i remains unmatched. In any such circumstance, the following preference
profile is in i’s inference set:
i : · · · ′ i ′ k







Individual rationality of the mechanism guarantees that i could not have been worse off by truth-
telling, for any set of reports in i’s inference set. On the other hand, if the reported preferences
are indeed ′′−i, then stability (not IR) implies that φ(i,′′−i)(i) = k i i, since otherwise (i, k)
would be a blocking pair. To see that no misreport of the form of 2 can be regret-free, suppose ′i
is such that ∃j ∈ Ui(i) and j ∈ Ai(′i). Then, ∃µ ∈ M|′i : µ(i) = j. Since φ(·) is individually
rational, φ(i, ̃−i) i j.
For any misrepresentation that fits the conditions of 3, the following algorithm finds a matching
µ at which i regrets reporting ′i through i for an arbitrary i in the receiving side. An analogous
argument works for an agent in the proposing side.35
Let |J | denote the cardinality of the agents on the proposing side that are acceptable to i
with respect to her true preference profile. Relabel agents such that their index reflects their ranking
according toi; i.e. j1 is thei-maximal element (agent) onAi,1(i) = Ai(i), j2 thei-maximal
element on Ai,2(i) = Ai,1(i) \ {j1}, etc.
Step 1. If the index of the ′i-maximal element on Ai,|J |−1(i) is smaller than the index of
the ′i-maximal element on Ai,|J |(i), then go to step 2.
Otherwise, set µ ∈ M|′i : µ(i) = {
′
i-maximal element on Ai,|J |−1(i)} and µ(k) =
k ∀k 6= {i, µ(i)}.36 Break.
Step k ∈ {2, . . . , |J | − 1}. If the index of the ′i-maximal element on Ai,|J |−k(i) is smaller
than the index of the ′i-maximal element on Ai,|J |−(k−1)(i), then go to step k + 1.
Otherwise, set µ ∈ M|′i : µ(i) = {
′
i-maximal element on Ai,|J |−k(i)} and µ(k) =
k ∀k 6= {i, µ(i)}. Break.
Given that ′i is a permutation of i on Ai(i) it cannot be the case that ∀j ∈ Ai(i) jk ′i jl
whenever k < l. Therefore the algorithm necessarily sets a µ. Next we explain why at such µ i
regrets ′i through i.
First, consider a case where the algorithm stops after step 1, setting µ(i) = x = {′i-maximal
element on Ai,|J |−1(i)}. By construction of DA, i can only have received offers from x and
y = {′i-maximal element on Ai,|J |(i)}, necessarily so from x since it is matched to him under
the observed matching. The preference profiles ̃−i ∈M|′i are divided into those cases in which
i received an offer from y and those in which it did not; there always exist preference profiles that
35In the case of the receiving side described in the text the algorithm looks for the first switch in the preference
relation from least- to most-preferred acceptable alternative. In the case of the proposing side the search is done from
most- to least-preferred acceptable partner.
36The essential part of the matching found by the algorithm is to whom agent i is matched, the choice of leaving
everyone else unmatched is arbitrary and not unique.
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satisfy each condition. If she did not, then she only observed an offer from x and consequently,
φ(i, ̃−i) = φ(′i, ̃−i) = x since i does not reject or accept any offer differently under ′i than
under i. On the other hand, if i received an offer from y it means at some point she decided
between y and x in favor of x. However, since the algorithm stopped to produce µ it means that
y i x, consequently φ(i, ̃−i) i φ(′i, ̃−i).
The same logic extends to the case where the algorithm stops at a step k: i cannot have received
offers from any z ′i µ(i). For any s, t ∈ J : µ(i) ′i s and µ(i) ′i t it is the case that
s ′i t ⇐⇒ s i t. That is, the binary relation between the options that can potentially have made
an offer to i is the same under ′i than under i, which means that any offer that did not involve
µ(i) is accepted or rejected in the same manner under both′i andi. The only cases in which they
differ are in those where µ(i)was chosen over some s ∈ J : µ(i) ′i s and s i µ(i). Consequently
φ(i, ̃−i) i φ(′i, ̃−i).

A.2. One-to-one matching: Quantile- and interior-stable mechanisms
Theorem 2. In any non-extreme q-quantile-stable matching mechanism is not regret-free truth-
telling; that is, ∀q ∈ (0, 1) there is a market (M,W,) such that ∃i ∈ N = M ∪ W and a
µ = φq() where i regrets i at µ through some ′i∈ Pi
Proof: Fix q ∈ (0, 1). Without loss of generality, consider i = m1. Define the function ′m1 :
Pi → Pi which will serve as the misreport that leads m1 to regret truth-telling; as anticipated in





w′ ⇐⇒ w m1 w′ ∀(w,w′) ∈ W 2
w ′m1 m1 ⇐⇒ w m1 φ
q(m1 ,−m1)(m1) ∀w ∈ W




Lemma 1. S(′m1 ,−m1) = {µ ∈ S(m1 ,−m1) : µ m1 φ
q()} ∀ ∈ P
Proof of Lemma: The lemma follows from the following two claims:
Claim 5. S(′m1 ,−m1) ⊆ S(m1 ,−m1)
Proof of claim: Suppose not, then there exists µ ∈ S(′m1 ,−m1) and µ /∈ S(m1 ,−m1).
It must be the case that µ is either blocked by a pair or by an individual under . If µ is not
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individually rational under (m1 ,−m1) then it is not individually rational under (′m1 ,−m1).
This is straightfoward since′−m1=−m1 , and form1 it is a consequence ofA(
′
m1
) ⊆ A(m1) by
construction of ′m1 . Suppose it is blocked by a pair (mj, w) : mj 6= m1, then since 
′
−m1=−m1 ,
(mj, w) also blocks µ under preference profile (′m1 ,−m1). Then it has to be the case that the
blocking pair involves m1. If µ(m1) = w′, then it must hold that w′ m1 w and w ′m1 w
′,
but it contradicts the construction of ′m1 since it does not permute binary relations that do not
involve alternative m1, which denotes remaining single. Lastly, consider the case µ(m1) = m1
then it means m1 must be single in every stable matching under (′m1 ,−m1). If µ is blocked
by a pair (m1, w), then it must be that ∀µ′′ ∈ S(m1 ,−m1) : µ′′(m1) ∈ W .37 Next we note
that A(′m1) ⊇ {µM(m1 ,−m1)} since, by construction of 
′
m1
, all women w that satisfy
w m1 φq(m1 ,−m1) are listed as acceptable in the soft-truncation; w ∈ A(′m1). Again,
µM(m1 ,−m1) = m1 contradicts the hypothesis (for the same argument as in the previous
footnote).On the other hand, µM(m1 ,−m1) 6= m1 implies µM(′m1 ,−m1) 6= m1, which holds
since theM -DA follows the same steps; if at some point µM(′m1 ,−m1)(m1) rejected him at any
step, then it should have rejected him in µM(m1 ,−m1)(m1). 
By the construction of ′m1 if follows that S(
′
m1
,−m1) ⊆ {µ m1 φq()}.
Claim 6. µ ∈ S(m1 ,−m1) and µ m1 φ(m1 ,−m1) =⇒ µ ∈ S(′m1 ,−m1).
Proof of claim: Suppose not, so µ /∈ S(′m1), then either it is not individual rational or it is
blocked by a pair. If j j µ(j) for j 6= {m1} then µ /∈ S(m1), on the other hand if m1 ′m1 µ(i)
then µ m1 φq() m1 m1. If it is blocked by a pair (mj, w) j 6= {1} then they are also a blocking
pair to µ under (m1 ,−m1). Lastly consider the blocking pairs (m1, w). If µ(m1) 6= m1, since by
construction ′m1 does not change the binary relations not involving the alternative of being single
37Suppose not, so that µ′′(m1) = m1 ∀µ′′ ∈ S(m1 ,−m1); since (m1, w) is the blocking pair, it follows that
w m1 m1 andm1 w µ(w). Now let
µ̃ =





µ̃ is an individually rational matching. Either, µ̃ is stable, in which case µ̃(m1) = w ∈ W which contradicts
@µ ∈ S(m1 ,−m1) : µ(m1) 6= m1, or µ̃ is unstable. If the latter holds, still it must be individually rational (since it
was stable for (′m1 ,−m1)), then by the strong stability property (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Theorem 3.4, p. 56)
there exists µ̄ ∈ S(m1 ,−m1) : µ̄ m1 µ̃ and µ̄ w µ̃. Since µ̃(m1) = w then µ̄(m1) ∈W which is a contradiction.
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m1, they would also be a blocking pair to (m1, w). Lastly, if µ(m1) = m1, w ′m1 m1 and since
A(′m1) ⊆ A(m1), w m1 m1 which contradicts µ ∈ S(m1 ,−m1). 

Remark 1. For any q ∈ (0, 1), φq(′m1 ,−m1) m1 φ
W (′m1 ,−m1) = φ
q(m1 ,−m1).
Theorem (Chen et al., 2014, Theorem 4). For any q, q′ ∈ (0, 1] : q 6= q′ there exists a matching
market such that φq is different than φq′ .
The key for this result is to find a market with enough stable matchings such that the non-extreme
quantile mechanism and the extreme one result in different matches; i.e. k(q′ − q) > 1 where
k = |S()|. Note that a priori we need a little more, since it could be the case that the matches are
different but m1 is matched to the same partner in both. Putting together the remark, the theorem,
and taking into account the construction of ′m1 we get the following corollary,
Corollary 4. Let q ∈ (0, 1), and define k?(q) = min{k ∈ N : k(1 − q) ≥ 1}. If ∃(′m1 ,−m1)
such that (1) |S(′m1 ,−m1)| ≥ k
?(q); and, (2) µ(m1) 6= µ′(m1) for all µ, µ′ ∈ S(′m1 ,−m1)
then φq(′m1 ,−m1) m1 φ
W (′m1 ,−m1) = φ
q(m1 ,−m1).
Let k̂ := inf{k ∈ N : dkqe ≥ k?(q)}, and consider the following preferences:
?m1 :w1, w2, . . . , wk̂−1, wk̂ 
?
wk̂
:m1,m2, . . . ,mk̂−1,mk̂ (?)
?m2 :w2, w3, . . . , wk̂, w1 
?
wk̂−1
:mk̂,m1, . . . ,mk̂−2,mk̂−1
... ...
?mk̂ :wk̂, w1, . . . , wk̂−2, wk̂−1 
?
w1
:m2,m3, . . . ,mk̂,m1
This is a fairly standard way of generating a matching with |S(m1 ,−m1)| = k̂ (see Thurber
(2002) and Chen et al. (2014)) namely, to construct preferences such that they form a Latin square
marriage of order k̂.38 Butmoreover, each individual gets a different partner in each stablematching.
As a consequence of Lemma 1, if |S(m1 ,−m1)| = k̂(q) and {k̂ ∈ N : dk̂qe ≥ k?(q)} it follows
38Dénes and Keedwell (1991): A Latin square of order n is an n× n matrix L whose entries are taken from a set S
of n symbols and which has the property that every symbol from S occurs exactly once in each row and exactly once
in each column.
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that |S(′m1 ,−m1)| ≥ k
?(q), then corollary 4 applies and we get that
φq(′m1 ,−m1) m1 φ
q(m1 ,−m1)
which contradicts truth being regret-free.
Consequently, for any non-extreme (q ∈ (0, 1)) q−quantile stable matching mechanism, we can
find a market (M,W,) where an agent i ∈ N regrets truth i through some other report ′i.39,40

Theorem 3. Let φ be an interior-stable mechanism, then φ is not regret-free truth-telling.
Proof: Consider a market with |M | = |W | = 4, and Latin square preferences (?).41 The instance
presents four stable matchings, S(∗) = {µ1 = µM , µ2, µ3, µW = µ4}. In each stable matching
every agent gets a different stable partner. Manm1’s preferences are such that





By assumption the mechanism φ is interior-stable, so φ(∗) /∈ {µW , µM} =⇒ φ(∗) ∈
{µ2, µ3}. Suppose, wlog, that φ(∗) = µ3.
Consider the case wherem1’s preferences are according to∗, he reports truthfully and observes
matching µ3. Necessarily, ∗−m1 is inm1’s inference set. Suppose he considers the soft-truncation
′m1 : w1, w2, w3,m1, w4
By virtue of the lemma 1,
S(′m1 ,
∗
−m1) = {µ1, µ2, µ3}.




−m1) = µ3 = φ(
∗).
39The theorem holds for every (M,W,) : M ≥ M?(q) = k̂(q) andW ≥ W ?(q) = k̂(q) the reason being that it
will be a Latin rectangle which can be completed into a Latin square, this is a consequence of Hall’s theorem.
40This is a maximal domain result; for any q it gives us an instance where someone regrets and tells us that for any
instance greater than that it also will; however, this does not mean that it is the smallest instance at which an agent
would regret truth in the q−quantile mechanism
41The market need not be balanced, its size can be arbitrarily large as long as it has four agents on each side. It can
also be thought to be embedded in a larger market.
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We still need to argue that there is an instance in the inference set where the soft-truncation would
have yielded a strictly better outcome. Since the mechanism is interior-stable, it follows that
φ(′m1 ,
∗
−m1) = µ2 m1 µ3.
Hence, if the stable mechanism selects matching µ3 when the preferences are∗, then any man (in
particularm1), regrets truth-telling in φ through a soft-truncation.
Lastly, note that the argument is wlog. If φ(P ∗) = µ2 the same argument would hold for any
woman.
The argument holds beyond the instance of ∗. It makes use of the fact that some agent can
potentially have (at least) four different stable partners in consecutive stable matchings. This matters
because (i) it means that the soft-truncation is actually binding (i.e. cutting out some stable partner);
(ii) it has enough stable matchings to select from. 
A.3. Many-to-one matching: capacity misrepresentation
Theorem 5. If φ is the hospital-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism, a hospital can regret
reporting its true capacity. On the other hand, if φ is the doctor-proposing deferred acceptance
mechanism, then φ is regret-free truth-telling for doctors, and reporting the true capacities is
regret-free for hospitals.
The following example adapted from Sönmez (1997) shows that, when the clearinghouse uses
H-DA, reporting capacities truthfully is not regret-free for hospitals.
The market presents two hospitals {1, 2} with two vacancies each, and three doctors {A,B,C}.
Hospital 2’s responsive preferences are:
2:{B,C}, {A,C}, C, {A,B}, B,A.





Notice that in matching µ1 hospital 2 fills only one vacancy. Had hospital 2 reported a capacity
equal to one (the number of vacancies filled under µ1, it could have done at least as well for any
preferences and capacities in its inference set, and strictly better for some of them, thus making
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hospital 2 regret revealing its capacity truthfully.
To see that hospital 2 could not have done worse by reporting only one vacancy, recall that we
can think of a multi-unit hospital, as two copies with unit capacity and with the same preferences
over individuals. Then, subreporting capacity is equivalent to one of these copies increasing the
ranking of the option of remaining unmatched; which is a monotonic transformation of the original
preferences. By Kojima and Manea (2010), the H-DA is weak Maskin monotonic in the auxiliary
market with copies, and the matched copy gets a weakly better assignment.
On the other hand, given the profile ̂ below, by reporting only one vacancy, the H-DA would
have matched hospital 2 to doctor C which they strictly prefer to doctor A.
̂1 : {A,B}, {A,C}, A, {B,C}, B, C
̂A : 2, 1
̂B : 1, 2
̂C : 1, 2








Therefore, H-DA is not regret-free truth-telling for hospitals when reporting capacities.
The second half of Theorem 5 follows from a result by Ehlers (2010) that states that the D-DA
is non-manipulable-through-capacities by those hospitals whose capacity was not filled. Hence,
the only hospitals that could potentially manipulate are those that filled their capacity. In order to
regret truth-telling they would have to subreport capacity, but they cannot guarantee that they will
fill their positions only with weakly and strictly preferable candidates.
